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Abstract 
 
The belief that „mixed‟ communities are fairer goes back to the 19th Century and the 
founders of the Garden City Movement. The idea is now firmly established in OECD 
and national policies. This paper reviews the evidence and argues that this is 
essentially a faith-based policy since there is scant real evidence that making 
communities more mixed improves the life chances of the poor. There is 
overwhelming evidence that the attributes which make neighbourhoods attractive are 
capitalised into house prices. This means that poor people cannot afford to buy into 
nicer neighbourhoods which anyway have amenities of no value to them. Moreover 
„specialised neighbourhoods‟ contribute to agglomeration economies and seem to be 
welfare enhancing. Thus policies for mixed neighbourhoods treat the symptoms rather 
than the causes of poverty. Efforts to improve social equity would be more effectively 
directed towards people themselves rather than trying to force neighbourhoods to be 
mixed. 
 
 
JEL Classifications: H41; H42; I30; I38; R23; R28 
Key words: Mixed Communities; social exclusion; segregation; local public goods; 
housing policy
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1.  Introduction1 
In this paper I analyse the welfare and equity implications of policies designed to 
create ‗mixed communities‘ in cities compared to the ‗fact‘ of social segregation: 
segregation on the basis of income, ethnicity, age and other characteristics. This 
analysis and re-assessment of the evidence calls into question current policies 
designed to produce ‗mixed communities‘. Although empirically income mixing, even 
in very small neighbourhoods, is considerable (see, for example Hardman and 
Ioannides, 2004) it is still true that poor people tend to be concentrated in poor 
neighbourhoods and richer people in more affluent ones.  
 
In the face of this voluntary residential separation of different groups, we behave and 
apply policies as if it were a fact that their separation into distinct and relatively 
homogeneous neighbourhoods generated specific social costs, additional to those 
generated by inequality itself. But careful examination of the evidence suggests that 
such policies for neighbourhood mixing are based more on faith than on any real 
evidence of additional social ills stemming specifically from geographical 
concentrations of poverty and affluence. Indeed, although the focus of this paper is 
mainly on income mixing, it is not clear what social gains are derived from forcing 
neighbourhoods to be more mixed on the basis of any specific characteristic, whether 
income, age, marital status, educational attainments or ethnicity.  
 
The policies of many liberal governments would be to favour greater equality and a 
progressive tax system. If effective, such policies improve the life chances of the poor 
and disadvantaged. The question, however is whether – given the distribution of 
income – policies to make neighbourhoods more mixed than individuals choose for 
themselves is an effective way of helping the poor and disadvantaged. This issue is 
important because a reduction in the intensity of income segregation, by means of 
active policies to foster ‗mixed communities‘, is an explicit aim of government policy 
in many OECD countries and a favoured outcome of ‗new urbanism‘.  
 
The fundamental issue underlying this paper‘s argument is one of causation. We know 
that living in nicer neighbourhoods costs more. As I show below, it costs a great deal 
more. So there is very clear evidence that poor people are concentrated in poor 
neighbourhoods as a result of their low incomes: living in cheap neighbourhoods costs 
less. The issue is whether living in a poor neighbourhood is a separate, significant 
additional cause of poverty. To make a serious, evidence-based case that mixed 
communities are effective policies to reduce social inequality, we would need to 
establish four key propositions: 
1. Geographically concentrated poverty was worse in welfare terms than diffused 
poverty; 
2. Creating mixed communities of poor and rich reduced the ‗costs‘ of poverty; 
                                                 
1 I would like acknowledge the financial support of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and thank Alison 
Weingarten for research assistance and Stephen Sheppard for our long term research collaboration. 
This paper draws on ideas we have discussed and developed together over the years. In addition I have 
benefited from discussions and input from many colleagues. I would like especially to thank Katharine 
Knox, Doug Krupka, Gwilym Pryce, Bruce Weinberg and an anonymous referee for helpful and 
sometimes critical comments. The paper has benefited from these. Although I have disagreed with 
several of the comments I hope the arguments have been strengthened and improved. The mistakes are 
entirely my own. 
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3. The welfare costs of geographically concentrated poverty were greater than the 
benefits from living in ‗specialised‘ neighbourhoods; 
4. Creating mixed communities of poor and rich was a cost effective way of 
addressing the problem of inequality. 
 
The paper starts with a very brief discussion of the origins of the idea that mixed 
neighbourhoods offer a socially superior way of living, reducing the hardships and 
disadvantages of poverty. The next section examines the evidence relating to the first 
of the above propositions: that living in a worse or more deprived neighbourhood is a 
separate evil from poverty itself and reduces a person‘s (child‘s) chances in life over 
and beyond the disadvantages engendered by poverty. This is commonly called the 
‗neighbourhood effect‘ and is examined in two ways. I first examine the evidence on 
the impact on welfare if people are moved from deprived neighbourhoods to more 
affluent ones. This draws mainly on evidence from the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) 
experiment in the US, a unique, semi-scientific, experiment set up to help some poor 
households make such a move and to track the results. The other main source of 
rigorous evidence is derived from cohort studies which attempt to isolate the specific 
effects of the type of neighbourhood from which a person originates (or has 
previously lived) on life outcomes. The discussion then moves on to consider the 
evidence as to how neighbourhoods ‗work‘ and influence both welfare and labour 
market outcomes. 
 
In section 4 I review the evidence as to why neighbourhoods segregated by income 
persist. This looks first at the dynamics of neighbourhood segregation – what happens 
to people in poor neighbourhoods who upgrade their skills. Observations that there is 
a significant income mixing at the local level have been based on cross sectional data. 
Cross sectional mixing does not imply that mixed neighbourhoods are equilibrium 
outcomes. This section goes on to examine the way in which housing markets 
effectively price the poor out of nice neighbourhoods and how this process interacts 
with (changes in) the distribution of income. 
 
I conclude by drawing together this evidence and discussing how it relates to the 
arguments about the relationship between poverty and place and ‗neighbourhood 
effects‘ and what policies might most effectively address the problems of poverty and 
income inequality.  
 
2. Why neighbourhoods should be mixed: but are not 
 
The desire for neighbourhoods to be more ‗mixed‘ or ‗balanced‘ is not new. It can be 
traced back at least as far as the 19th Century designers and visionaries who gave rise 
to the Garden City Movement and, ultimately, to town and country planning. One of 
the first developments reflecting these new impulses was Bedford Park, in Chiswick, 
West London, which began with the construction of the District line of the 
underground in 1871. It was designed to provide a community within easy reach of 
London and to attract liberal professionals and artists, with cottages, as well as 
substantial middle class homes, in order to ensure ‗social balance‘. The construction 
of cottages was stopped, however, soon after the first residents arrived and 
complained that such houses would ‗attract the wrong sort of tenants‘ (Affleck 
Greeves, 1975). Similarly, Hampstead Garden Suburb, started in 1910 by two 
disciples of Ebenezer Howard, was intended to be a ‗balanced‘ community but within 
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a short period had become an affluent professional suburb (Weinreb and Hibbert, 
1993).  
 
More recent work, associated notably with Wilson (1987), identified a problem of 
social exclusion, with significant harmful effects associated with living in 
neighbourhoods in which poverty was concentrated. This was part of the argument of 
the British government department responsible for planning, housing and urban policy 
when – briefly – it was idiosyncratically known as the Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister (ODPM, 2005): 
 
“People living in deprived neighbourhoods are less likely to work, more likely to be 
poor and have lower life expectancy, more likely to live in poorer housing in 
unattractive local environments with high levels of antisocial behaviour and 
lawlessness and more likely to receive poorer education and health services. Living in 
a deprived area adversely affects individuals‟ life chances over and above what would 
be predicted by their personal circumstances and characteristics.” (ODPM, 2005, 
page 6). 
 
The report documented in great detail differences in outcomes for people living in 
deprived areas (defined as the 10% most deprived wards identified by the Index of 
Multiple Deprivation) compared to the average for England as a whole. 
‗Worklessness rates‘ (ODPM 2005‘s preferred measure combining the non-
participants with the unemployed of working age) were some 25% compared to less 
than 10%; a third more of the adult population of such areas had no qualifications; and 
life expectancy was two years less. To conclude from this evidence that mixed 
communities provided a recipe for reducing inequality and tackling social exclusion, 
however, was either naive or demonstrated sleight of hand. None of the figures 
supposedly showing the problems of living in deprived areas related to individuals of 
given or ‗similar‘ characteristics to people not living in deprived areas. It was all 
measures of the average levels of income, health, education or ‗worklessness‘ of the 
inhabitants of the deprived areas. Crime rates were just that: the rate of crime in 
deprived neighbourhoods. The problem is that none of this evidence is in dispute. It 
simply does not address the issue of causation.  
 
Not only is the desire for mixed neighbourhoods not new, it is, one might suspect, 
suspiciously old. It was originally formulated as a social aspiration without any 
diagnosis of the root causes of poverty but a firm belief in improving peoples‘ lives by 
improving the built environment. In the context of public health, this was perhaps the 
single biggest step towards making cities healthier and more habitable ever made. As 
a solution for poverty, it appears only to address an obvious symptom. For a sceptical 
academic, indeed, there must be a fear that researchers and policy makers for the past 
30 years, have been trying to retrofit the analysis and evidence to support the 
‗solution‘ fixed on by the pioneers of town planning in the 19th Century.  
  
If the policy had no costs – even though it was not effective in improving welfare or 
reducing income inequality – it would not be problematic. Attempting to implement 
it, however, costs significant resources. This can be illustrated in Britain but similar 
costs arise in all OECD countries which pursue policies for mixed communities. 
There are direct government expenditures subsidising the provision of lower income 
housing in higher income developments but in Britain most of the resources devoted 
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to generating mixed communities are provided in kind – not part of measured 
government expenditure. Because of the extreme scarcity of developable land – the 
result of 60 years of ‗urban containment‘ policies – obtaining ‗planning permission‘ 
(zoning permits to build houses) generates extraordinary increases in land values. 
Agricultural land in most of South East England increases in value from less than 
£10,000 per ha to £3, £4 or even as much as £8 million per ha on the outskirts of 
Oxford or in the more desirable parts of Buckinghamshire (Valuation Office Agency, 
2007). To obtain the essential planning permissions, developers negotiate so-called 
Section 106 Agreements with the local planning authority obliging them to provide 
additional development, or supply land, for ‗public benefit‘: that is gift the specified 
developments or provide them below cost. The most common form these benefits take 
is an obligation to build ‗affordable‘ housing or ‗social‘ housing within their 
commercial development. Until a change in political control in 2008 the Greater 
London Authority, for example, demanded that 50 percent of all housing constructed 
by the private sector should be such ‗affordable‘ housing built within each substantial 
private development.  
 
Poor people are concentrated in poor neighbourhoods because housing there is 
cheaper. If that is the only direction of causation for observed patterns of segregation 
then social segregation is a manifestation of voluntary sorting, conditioned by income. 
Just as richer households buy more expensive and better clothes and better holidays, 
health care and educational opportunities for their children, so they ‗buy‘ better 
neighbourhoods. If this is the direction of causation, the equity problem is not with the 
places in which people live but with the distribution of incomes. Unless there is clear 
evidence of reverse causation, the case for mixed communities cannot be evidence 
based.  
 
It is, of course, possible – superficially even plausible - that geographically 
concentrated poverty is a greater social evil than dispersed poverty. There is a strong 
correlation between living in a deprived neighbourhood and being poor: or living in a 
neighbourhood dominated by immigrants or ethnic minorities and being an immigrant 
or a member of a minority ethnic group. So it might seem obvious that living in poor 
and deprived neighbourhoods must impose costs on the inhabitants of those 
neighbourhoods beyond the disadvantages of low incomes, poor health, migrant status 
or lack of labour market skills. The families living in such neighbourhoods experience 
poor services, frequently have a worse environmental quality (atmospheric pollution 
or noise), suffer greater ill health and are much more likely to be the victims of crime. 
The schools which serve such neighbourhoods score less well measured by the exam 
results their pupils achieve or by truancy rates. Children growing up in such 
neighbourhoods do not have the chances in life that children raised in advantaged 
neighbourhoods have. That seems obvious and it is what we appear to believe. 
 
The problem with this conclusion is that it ignores a number of difficult facts. The 
first of these is that in all cities for which there is evidence, neighbourhoods have been 
segregated. This was very clearly the case in ancient Rome in which there were 
neighbourhoods segregated by artisanal trade as well as income. The particular 
patterns of segregation seem to be remarkably stable over time. Many of the London 
neighbourhoods amongst the poorest in 1881 were still amongst the poorest in 2001 
(Meen et al, 2007); there is substantial stability in the pattern of the local authority 
areas which were most segregated in 1971 and in 2001 (Meen, 2006). Moreover, 
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when policy has deliberately constructed ‗mixed‘ neighbourhoods, over time they 
have tended to become segregated again.  
 
Perhaps the English village provided the romantic blueprint for the ‗mixed 
community‘. But even there, the ‗rich man was in his castle and the poor man at his 
gate‘. Being small communities, however, the rich ‗neighbourhood‘ sometimes 
consisted only of the ‗big house‘ or the manor. The rural poor often lived in crowded 
hovels – most of which have not survived. The larger an urban area is, the larger the 
areas dominated by particular types of household, rich or poor, tend to be (Gordon 
and Monastiriotis, 2006). As Krupka (2007) points out, using neighbourhoods of 
roughly constant size (such as Census Tracts or Local Authority areas) the larger the 
city is, the greater the degree of measured segregation there will appear to be, other 
things being equal. This is because there are enough households in particular income 
groups to fill up more completely any fixed size of ‗neighbourhood‘. Useful 
definitions of neighbourhood, therefore, are likely to vary with city size and be largest 
in the largest cities. 
 
With the ex-urbanisation of British cities, villages – or at least those that have an 
agricultural origin - typically have become segregated, rich, commuter communities. 
Functionally such villages have become high income component neighbourhoods of 
large city-regions. In the sense used in this paper, they are ‗specialised 
neighbourhoods‘ of large urban areas2. Indeed, it can be argued that specialisation is 
the central contribution of cities to progress and welfare.  
 
Underlying the longevity and pervasiveness of residential segregation in human 
settlements is the second difficult fact ignored by advocates of ‗mixed 
neighbourhoods‘. Specialisation underlies the agglomeration economies cities 
generate, both in production and in terms of the additional choices they provide for 
consumption and lifestyles; and segregated neighbourhoods are simply the flip side of 
specialised neighbourhoods. A larger number of specialised neighbourhoods provide a 
wider choice of urban community types and social settings in which to live. Like all 
other choices about what to consume, choosing where to live is strictly subject to the 
constraint imposed by one‘s income.  
 
This is the third difficult fact advocates of mixed neighbourhoods ignore: establishing 
the direction of causation. If neighbourhood choice is conditioned by income, poor 
neighbourhoods exist because there are poor people and we live in an unequal society; 
as is explained below, given that degree of inequality, we may be collectively and 
individually better off, living in neighbourhoods with other similar households, 
whether we are rich or poor. For any given distribution of household incomes that 
could be an argument for allowing specialised neighbourhoods to develop of their 
own accord; but not for policies promoting specialised neighbourhoods (unless there 
is some problem of government or market failure that underprovides them). 
                                                 
2 Throughout this paper the term ‗specialised neighbourhoods‘ is used to indicate a residential 
neighbourhood in which households of a particular character tend to be concentrated. Deprived 
neighbourhoods would therefore be an example; but so would neighbourhoods predominantly occupied 
by other groups such as middle-aged, middle-class white commuters, young professionals, young 
families, Sylheti-speaking Bangladeshi Muslims, Hindi-speaking Hindus or Polish migrant workers. 
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Questioning the case for policies for promoting mixed neighbourhoods is certainly 
not, however, advocating having greater inequity or poverty within a rich society. 
 
Not only do policies for generating mixed neighbourhoods ignore inconvenient facts, 
they are also, as Krupka (2008) points out, at odds with three of the best established 
theoretical models in urban economics. Tiebout (1956) has a model of mobile urban 
residents voting with their feet to concentrate in communities providing the best mix 
of taxes and local public goods given their incomes and preferences. Alonso (1964) – 
still perhaps the most important single theoretical contribution to urban economics – 
concludes that with centrally located employment, annular rings of exclusive land use 
will tend to be established as business users and residents trade-off the value to them 
of accessibility against the costs of space. This has traditionally been interpreted as 
implying residential segregation by income group, with zones occupied at high 
densities close to the centre by poor residents and richer households living at lower 
densities further from the city-centre. Although this particular conclusion has been 
challenged (by, for example, Brueckner et al., 1999), income segregation does seem 
the likely outcome of monocentric models. Finally there is the model of Schelling 
(1969) which on the basis of a simple preference for not being the minority in ones 
immediate neighbourhood predicts social segregation as the equilibrium outcome. 
 
 
3. Poverty and place: determining causation 
 
In trying to figure out the direction of causation between poverty and place, there are 
two major problems. The first is how to be sure when we compare the outcomes for 
individuals living in different types of areas that we have adjusted for all the relevant 
characteristics.  When studies compare indicators of deprivation of those living in 
deprived communities with those living in more affluent neighbourhoods there may 
be important but difficult to measure characteristics influencing people‘s life chances 
which are not standardised for because they are not observed. For example, there may 
be a genetic pre-disposition to suffer from dyslexia which then influences a whole 
range of other outcomes, including income and so neighbourhood choice; people also 
vary in their motivation and aspirations, even their luck.  
 
The second issue is that above all people select the neighbourhoods – subject of 
course to varying constraints – in which they live. As Goering et al (2003) point out: 
 
“Since people typically select their neighbourhoods to match their needs and 
resources, researchers restricted to cross-sectional, nonexperiemental evidence must 
try to separate the impact of personal factors affecting choice of neighbourhood from 
effects of neighbourhood. But it is difficult if not impossible to measure all those 
socioeconomic, personal and local characteristics well enough to distinguish their 
effects.” Goering et al, 2003, page 4. 
 
Separating the impact of personal factors affecting choice of neighbourhood from the 
effects of neighbourhood requires great ingenuity and work on the part of the 
researcher. The evidence on which ODPM (2005) based their policy 
recommendations did not even begin to make the essential adjustments for difficult to 
observe personal characteristics that methodological rigor demands. 
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Experimental evidence from moving poor people to affluent neighbourhoods 
The US Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment is probably the most carefully 
researched evidence available on the issue. The MTO programme was set up in 1992 
to ‗assist very low income families with children who reside in public housing…. to 
move out of areas with high concentrations of persons living in poverty to areas with 
low concentrations of such persons…‘3 The MTO project was designed both to pilot a 
policy designed to relieve the perceived problems of concentrated neighbourhood 
poverty and as a scientific experiment to investigate – some claimed demonstrate – 
the benefits of policies to achieve more mixed communities. 
 
The pilot was carried out in five cities: Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles and 
New York. For the purposes of implementation ‗neighbourhoods‘ were defined as 
census tracts, so on average they contained around 4,400 people. The issue of what 
constitutes a neighbourhood is obviously an open one (see, for example, Ellen and 
Turner, 2003; Hardman and Ioannides, 2004; Durlauf, 2004; Bolster et al, 2007; or 
Krupka, 2007) but census tracts, which are designed to be relatively homogeneous in 
terms of population characteristics, are widely used as approximations in empirical 
research in the US.  
 
To be eligible for the programme a family had to live in public or assisted housing in 
a ‗poor‘ neighbourhood - one in which 40 percent or more of residents were below the 
poverty line. They also had to have at least one child under 18, not be behind with the 
rent, all family members had to be named on their current lease and no member of the 
family should have a criminal background. Thus, there were already two stages of 
selection before a family got on to the programme: 1) since only volunteers 
participated or were tracked, they had to want to move into a more affluent 
neighbourhood; and 2) they had to pass the eligibility criteria. This selection alone 
would be likely to have increased the chances of finding positive effects of moving 
poor families to affluent neighbourhoods. The most problematic families were 
ineligible and, presumably, only those who thought they had a chance of benefiting 
from such a move, volunteered4. There were also other factors, however, which 
arguably may have reduced the chances of finding positive effects of the move: for 
example, a significant proportion of the children involved remained in the same 
school which had served their deprived neighbourhood. 
 
Once in the programme families were randomly assigned to one of three groups. 
Group 1 received a subsidy only spendable if they moved to a relatively affluent 
neighbourhood. An affluent neighbourhood was defined as one in which 10 percent or 
less of the residents lived below the poverty line. Such families received expert advice 
from housing professionals to help them find suitable homes. Group 2 received a 
housing voucher/subsidy spendable in any location and no counselling. Group 3 – the 
control group - got no extra help but simply continued to live where they were 
(although of course free to move using their own resources). 
 
Across the five cities about a quarter of potentially eligible families applied for the 
programme with about 13 percent of those applying being ruled out because they did 
                                                 
3 Housing and Community Development Act 1992. 
4 It is worth noting that these methodological deficiencies would have disbarred the study had it been a 
field trial for a new drug or medical procedure.  
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not meet the conditions for selection. That still left some 4,600 families – enough for 
statistical analysis. The early evaluation of the programme, summarised in Goering 
and Feins (2003), was quite optimistic. Some of the successes reported were more or 
less definitional - such as the fact that the characteristics of the neighbourhoods in 
which those in Group 1 (assisted to move to more affluent neighbourhoods) lived at 
the end of three years were more affluent, with lower crime rates and better schools. 
There was also some evidence that successful movers had slightly different 
characteristics both from the residents of the poor neighbourhoods from which they 
were drawn (younger and poorer and more likely to be a female headed household) 
but also from those assigned to Group 1 but who failed to move, usually because they 
could not find a house or flat to move to. Successful movers were more likely to be 
enrolled in adult education and drive a car: they tended also to have been more 
dissatisfied with their existing housing and neighbourhood. Wanting to escape from 
high neighbourhood crime rates was the most common reason for participation in the 
MTO project. 
 
This early analysis of partial data suggested some positive findings. After two years 
there were indications of improvements in children‘s behaviour, health and 
educational achievement, compared to the control group, although similar 
improvements were observed in Group 2 families who had been helped to move to 
neighbourhoods of their own choice – not necessarily more affluent ones. There were, 
however, no differences in economic outcomes. Incomes and other labour market 
indicators for families moving to affluent neighbourhoods showed no improvement 
relative to other groups. Nevertheless, the programme was greeted as cautiously 
supporting the casual link from living in a deprived neighbourhood to negative 
impacts on an individual‘s life chances. But as Goering and Feins (2003) went on to 
note, the apparent modest initial success of the programme did not mean that it was a 
policy success. The impacts were quite modest and costs were considerable. The 
advice of the housing experts alone cost $3,000 per family that successfully moved.  
 
Longer term follow-up 
More recent research (Kling and Liebman, 2004; Kling et al 2005; Kling et al 2007) 
on the MTO, tracking families over a longer period, destroys even this cautious 
optimism on the project: or at least suggests causal processes are considerably more 
complex and outcomes of moving to an affluent neighbourhood more difficult to 
anticipate. Kling et al (2005) report on a follow up study analysing changes four to 
seven years after families had moved and used all data for the five cities. Their study 
uses sophisticated statistical methods and focuses particularly on differences in crime 
and behaviour. 
 
Kling et al‘s longer term follow-up confirms the finding of no improvement in 
economic indicators for adults who moved but the researchers looked at a wide range 
of indicators relating to educational achievement, health and welfare and also 
behaviour for younger people5. They focused on the age group – 15 to 25 – in which it 
                                                 
5 Kling et al 2005 report briefly on such factors as getting into fights, getting along with teachers, 
perceptions that school discipline was ‗fair‘, having five or more friends and reported feelings of 
worthlessness, finding no significant differences on any measure. A wide range of educational, mental 
and physical health and behavioural indicators was examined in Kling and Liebman, 2004. In general 
they reported some significant beneficial changes for girls but negative and mainly not significant 
effects for young males.  
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was most reasonable to look for signs of improvement. It is this age group which in 
the general population has the highest incidence of behavioural problems and within 
which educational progress might be most plausibly concentrated. So if moving to a 
more affluent neighbourhood produced any behavioural benefits these should be 
easiest to find in this age group. For none of the indicators, however, did they find any 
significant overall differences between the groups that moved neighbourhoods 
compared to the control group that was not helped to move. For the age group as a 
whole some indicators were better and some were worse but, despite the large sample, 
none of these differences was statistically significant. 
 
Subdividing into males and females did reveal some significant differences, however. 
Within the set of behavioural indicators were a number relating to criminality. Kling 
et al (2005) extended the self-reported data set by also tracing administrative arrest 
records providing two independent sources of data. They found that while for violent 
crime there continued to be non-significant but - if anything - favourable effects for 
both the groups which moved, for property arrests there were significant differences 
for girls compared to boys. For both boys and girls in the first two years after moving, 
property arrests fell, although the reduction was not statistically significant, but for 
boys it then rose and rose significantly compared to the control group during the third 
and fourth year after moving. Overall – for both sexes combined over the whole four 
years - there was no significant reduction in either arrests in total or in property arrests 
because the differences for boys and girls balanced out. For a small sub sample which 
it was possible to track over a six year period, the increase in property crime arrests 
for boys continued at about the same level. Similar, but non-significant, gender 
differences are reported, in passing, for mental and physical health, education and 
substance use. Overall, males in the moving group had scores on the behavioural 
problem index some 20 percent worse and arrest rates for property crime some 30 
percent higher than those of the control group of young males who did not move from 
their poor neighbourhoods. 
 
They carefully sift the evidence for explanations of these differences in behavioural 
outcomes. The reduction in girls‘ arrest rates for property crime suggested the 
increase in arrests for boys could not be explained by more efficient policing in the 
affluent neighbourhoods. Peer group sorting effects were implausible as an 
explanation since similar patterns of change were evident for both boys and girls even 
when they were subdivided into those with a history of criminal or behavioural 
problems before the move. If peer group sorting was the explanation then one would 
expect those who had had worse behaviour prior to moving would not have improved 
(if girls) or got worse (if boys) after the move. Differences in coping strategies in 
relation to the upset caused by moving to a different type of neighbourhood did not 
seem plausible as an explanation because in the early period following the move both 
boys and girls showed similar reductions in arrests: it was only after two years, when 
presumably most young people would have got over the disruptive effects of the 
move, that boys‘ arrest rates for property crime rose significantly. 
 
They come down in favour of what they call a ‗comparative advantage in property 
crime‘6 explanation partly by elimination but also because of the evidence in relation 
                                                 
6 By this they meant that the boys were doing not only absolutely worse in education and other realms 
than their new, affluent peer group but relatively worse in such terms than they would have done in 
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to educational performance. Although the schools which young people went to after 
moving to more affluent neighbourhoods were better on academic performance 
indicators for the children attending them, it turned out that moving did not 
significantly improve the educational performance of the individual children. Thus, 
children who did not move ended up doing better in school relative to their peers than 
children who moved. The children who moved now had academically stronger peers 
against whom they were measured. Moreover moving boys did worse than girls 
relative to their new peer groups. They were less academically competitive than girls 
were within their new schools. Boys were also less subject to parental supervision, 
had more absences from school and lower educational ambitions than girls. The girls 
who moved had improved expectations for completing college compared to the 
control group, greater participation in sports, a reduction in school absences and an 
increased association with peers who engaged in school activities. None of this was 
true of the boys who moved. Thus, the authors conclude the most plausible 
explanation is that as boys adjusted to their more affluent neighbourhoods, they found 
they had a comparatively worse position in educational terms compared to their new 
peer group neighbours but a realm in which they could succeed in their new 
neighbourhoods was property crime.  
 
Kling et al 2007 largely confirms these findings. It is methodologically even more 
rigorous but still finds no economic impacts – favourable or unfavourable – for adults 
in Group 1 nor evidence of improvements in physical health. They do find 
improvements in mental health for both adults and young women apparently related to 
reductions in (fear of) crime.  They also find beneficial effects for young females on 
educational outcomes, risky behaviour and physical health but again in the change for 
young females and males together these were offset by significant deteriorations in 
the same indicators for young males. So there was no net gain for young people 
overall from moving.  
 
One might comment, moreover, that if the improvements on mental health indicators 
resulted from reductions in the crime experienced by the moving groups it would 
seem likely to be orders of magnitude more cost-effective to achieve the reductions in 
crime in deprived neighbourhoods in the first place by substantial increases in police 
and more effective police methods. The MTO programme, in so far as it had produced 
the improvements in mental health for the group assisted to move to a more affluent 
neighbourhood, did so only for the tiny proportion of the original inhabitants who 
benefited. Measures to effectively reduce crime within deprived, high crime 
neighbourhoods would benefit all residents not just the lucky few subsidised to move. 
 
The MTO experiment has been summarised at length because, given the manifold 
difficulties, it is the best source of evidence for identifying the effect moving from a 
really deprived neighbourhood to a more affluent one has on those who make the 
move; it is equally the best source of evidence for identifying any beneficial effects of 
constructing mixed neighbourhoods. Other earlier studies and the initial evaluations of 
the MTO project are summarised in Durlauf (2004). Durlauf concludes that on the 
basis of studies then available, the balance of the empirical evidence did suggest there 
                                                                                                                                            
their old, deprived neighbourhoods compared to the peers they would have had there; they do not say - 
but perhaps they also imply - that they also had relatively more opportunities for property crime in their 
new, affluent neighbourhoods. 
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was a significant influence of neighbourhood, although he was acutely aware of the 
difficulties of identification7. 
 
This conclusion is overtaken by the longer term follow up studies of the MTO project. 
These show that moving to a more affluent neighbourhood does not improve an 
adult‘s economic situation and outcomes for children who move are complex and 
causation is uncertain, even when there appear to be significant effects8. On balance, 
there seem to be negative outcomes for boys on a range of indicators and positive 
outcomes for girls. One of the few indicators showing an improvement for both boys 
and girls is an important one – arrest rates for violent crime – but so far research does 
not show this to be statistically significant.   
 
The evidence from other studies on neighbourhood effects 
Similar experiments have not been tried in other countries. As an alternative 
methodology long term cohort studies offer the best solution for identifying the pure 
impact of neighbourhood on life chances. Two of the most convincing of these cohort 
studies, one in Canada and one in Britain, show a similar lack of significant long term 
effects of neighbourhood on life outcomes or success. Oreopoulos (2003) tracked 
individuals assigned as children to public housing locations in Toronto over 30 years. 
He starts with a sample of children born between 1963 and 1970, living in public 
housing projects with very different neighbourhood characteristics, and matches them 
by means of a very large administrative data base to their labour market 
characteristics in 1999. The simple relationship between neighbourhood and earnings 
appeared to be significant but, of course, families have a big influence on the 
behaviour and choices of children. Once the earnings of siblings was added as an 
explanatory variable, the statistical influence of neighbourhood entirely disappeared. 
The final conclusion was that the characteristics of the neighbourhood in which an 
individual was born or raised had no statistically significant effect on long term labour 
market outcomes or on prosperity.   
 
This finding is consistent with the methodologically completely different study of 
Bolster et al (2007). Using a British Household Panel Survey derived cohort dataset, 
following individuals for ten years, they find no evidence that original place of 
residence had any statistically significant influence on subsequent labour market 
success, whether measured as household incomes or as earnings. Their results may be 
slightly less persuasive than those of Kling et al or Oreopoulos since their data track 
                                                 
7 He compared results of 25 studies published between 1982 and 2003. Outcome measures ranged from 
marriage rates and teenage pregnancies through school drop out rates to standard labour market 
measures, such as wages or unemployment. All studies surveyed were econometric in nature and while 
some found no evidence of neighbourhood effects, the majority did conclude there was an impact of 
neighbourhood on outcomes for individuals. However, as Durlauf notes, methodological problems are 
severe and such evidence was unlikely to convince those who were sceptical. He wrote before the 
methodologically most convincing studies, those of Oreopoulos (2003) and Kling et al (2005; 2007), 
were available. 
8 Apart from the increase in boys‘ arrests for property crime in the longer term, the cause of some of 
the improvements in health measures are unclear. For example Katz et al (2001) note that the 
significant improvement in childhood asthma for both families moving to more affluent 
neighbourhoods and those moving to locations of their own choice, could be due to characteristics of 
the structures and particularly the absence of rats – a common asthma trigger - in the new homes and 
locations: not to classic neighbourhood effects. If reduction in exposure to rats were the cause then 
getting rid of rats would seem to be a very much more cost-effective policy to achieve the health 
improvement than mixed communities. 
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individuals over only ten years and they investigate only economic outcomes. But 
they explore a range of neighbourhood definitions, concluding that a small unit, of 
only about 500 people, is the most appropriate measure of neighbourhood, and they 
use statistically sophisticated techniques. They cannot entirely reject the possibility 
that the original neighbourhood in which someone lived, influences their future 
prosperity but they find no statistical evidence that it does. Indeed, although not 
statistically significant, their result is in fact the unexpected one. After standardising 
for all the other factors which influence incomes and earnings, coming from a poorer 
neighbourhood is associated with increased current prosperity! They conclude: 
 
[This] ―does not remove [the case for] an area-basis for policy. The high levels of 
clustering may mean that the most efficient way of targeting individual policies is on 
an area basis. Nevertheless the results support the idea that the main sources of low 
incomes are to be found in earnings, employment and demographics, not in 
neighbourhood characteristics.” Bolster et al (2007) page 34. 
 
Work for countries in continental Europe has not been able to apply such 
methodologically robust methods. There are no examples of either quasi-experiments, 
such as the MTO project, or long term cohort studies. Musterd (2006), however, does 
report work tracking individuals over time in The Netherlands and Sweden and 
relating changes in their prosperity to their individual characteristics and the 
characteristics of the neighbourhood in which they originally lived. These are for 
somewhat shorter periods than even the work of Bolster et al (2007) and the controls 
and statistical methods used are perhaps somewhat more limited. In The Netherlands, 
Musterd (2006) reports only the weakest and non-significant of neighbourhood effects 
for the very poorest, although the impact of a ‗bad‘ neighbourhood seemed to be 
slightly stronger for the next group up the ladder. Outcomes were measured as the 
probability of moving out of benefits and into a paid job between 1989 and 1994. In 
the Swedish cities there seemed to be more evidence of neighbourhood effects during 
the 1990s although these were still weak and high immigration rates in the early part 
of the period may have influenced the results. In the Swedish work, neighbourhood 
effects were also measured in terms of probability of people of working age moving 
into work off benefits, but over a longer period from 1991 to 1999. 
 
Perhaps the strongest evidence yet found for 'neighbourhood effects' comes from 
France. It relates to a restricted effect in educational achievement at school, however, 
rather than to long term outcomes for life chances (Goux and Maurin, 2007) but is 
certainly worth taking into account. Their study exploits a feature of the French 
Labour Force Survey which samples clusters of neighbours and, using an IV 
approach, they show that various educational performance indicators are statistically 
related to those of immediate peers in the neighbourhood rather than the classroom; 
for example, the probability of a 15-year old being held back a grade is about 8 
percentage points higher (+16% of an SD) if other adolescents in their neighbourhood 
were born at the beginning of the year (which in itself increases the probability of 
being held back by 15 percentage points).  
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Specialised neighbourhoods as sources of welfare 
As noted above, the tendency for people to sort into segregated or, in some sense 
specialised, neighbourhoods is a very strong one9. Cities which are socially segregated 
along income lines are a universally established fact. Authors who have recently 
addressed such issues include Hårsman (2006), Meen (2006) and Musterd (2006). 
Meen‘s work for Britain, already briefly summarised, shows beyond argument that 
not only is segregation on income and other measures a feature of cities at least since 
the late 19
th
 Century, but the incidence of such segregation is very persistent over 
time. Many of the same cities with the sharpest incidence of spatially segregated 
neighbourhoods measured on 1971 data, reappear in 2001 data. Many of the most 
deprived (and most affluent) neighbourhoods in London in 1881 appear again in much 
the same positions in 2001.  
 
Hårsman (2006) documents the stability of patterns of both income and ethnic 
segregation, particularly in Stockholm. In his detailed study of the long term evolution 
of patterns of ethnic segregation, he shows how its incidence has tended to intensify 
over the last 20 years and is only partly explained by income differences. His 
evidence is at least consistent with people from ethnic minorities mainly choosing to 
live in ethnically specialised neighbourhoods, despite official Swedish policy pushing 
for ethnic mixing.   
 
Musterd (2006) synthesises his work on three related areas: the (lack of) influence of 
segregation on the overall economic prosperity of the wider urban area; the very 
distinct neighbourhood choices of skilled workers in different economic sectors in 
Amsterdam; and comparative work on the effects of neighbourhood mix on individual 
success in The Netherlands and Sweden summarised above. In particular, he shows 
that highly skilled workers in different service sectors choose different types of 
neighbourhood. Workers in Information Communication Technologies, financial 
services and banking choose to concentrate in the suburbs of Amsterdam while skilled 
workers in the creative industries are selectively concentrated in central 
neighbourhoods.  
 
Labour market matching 
These findings are entirely consistent with those of Bayer et al (2005) for Boston. For 
a sample of 110,000 employed people, they match the precise location of residence 
and jobs and find a very strong tendency for people who live in the same 
neighbourhood (defined as a census block) also to work in the same census block. 
They make an elaborate and convincing effort to eliminate the effects of transport 
networks and other factors which might explain this finding independently of social 
interactions with neighbours - excluding non-family members. They find strong 
evidence showing that such interactions between neighbours strongly influence the 
                                                 
9 This is not to deny the fact that cross sectional data shows significant income mixing in even small 
neighbourhoods. Hardman and Ioannides (2004) report some two thirds of micro neighbourhoods 
(consisting of 10 households) contain at least one household with an income in the poorest one sixth of 
all households: and a half of micro neighbourhoods contain a family in the richest 20 percent of the 
income distribution. Krupka (2008) comments that in most US cities well over half the variance in 
income came from variations within the neighbourhood, as opposed to variation across 
neighbourhoods. But as he also points out this is still consistent with spatial segregation on the basis of 
income being the equilibrium outcome. Cities as systems are subject to continuous shocks in terms of 
their size and the distribution of household incomes and adjustment to such shocks may be slow given 
the costs of moving house. 
Policies for Mixed Communities: Faith-based Displacement Activity? 
 
14 
job locations of neighbours and that such interactions are more influential if 
neighbours are of a similar level of education, both parties have children and are of 
similar age. Their conclusion is that social interactions within neighbourhoods 
between people similar to each other are a significant factor in how urban labour 
markets work and people find jobs. 
 
Both sets of findings are consistent with earlier US findings, such as those of Blau and 
Robins (1992), about the importance in job search of informal networks with friends 
and relatives. Blau and Robins found that while this was a frequent - but not the most 
frequent - method of job search, and particularly important for the less skilled, it was 
the most successful form of job search from the point of view of both workers and 
employers. It produced the highest rate of job offers per contact and the highest rate of 
job offer acceptances. In their recent review of the literature, Ioannides and Loury 
(2004) report that, in addition, such jobs found through personal contacts lasted 
longer, so that around half of all jobs were held by people who had found them this 
way. Ioannides and Loury also report a persistent increase in the use of informal 
contacts as a means of job search over time – despite the rise in the internet – and that 
it is more prevalent, the larger a city is: in cities of more than 500,000 more than half 
of unemployed job searchers relied on friends and acquaintances; in cities smaller 
than 100,000 less than 10 percent did. Friends and acquaintances were a much more 
important source of jobs for those searching while unemployed than for those looking 
for new jobs while they were employed.  
 
These last two observations are particularly important in the present context. They 
show an important source of positive effects of specialised neighbourhoods for lower 
skilled as well as for more skilled workers - unemployed job seekers are on average 
less skilled than employed job seekers but use friends and acquaintances more. The 
fact that the use of friends and acquaintances increases with city size is consistent 
with the idea that specialised neighbourhoods represent a form of agglomeration 
economy. An advantage of larger cities is that they can support a greater range of 
specialised neighbourhoods and such neighbourhoods seem to be a fertile source of 
effective job matching. Of course, neighbourhoods could have such a high proportion 
of unemployed in them that job search advantages disappeared. The point is that 
forcing neighbourhoods to be mixed is likely to result in a loss of agglomeration 
economies and a loss that has a disproportionate impact on the less skilled and 
affluent. 
 
Another less obvious example of the ways in which specialised neighbourhoods may 
increase productivity is provided by work on ethnic neighbourhoods. There are 
obvious consumption benefits involved, as is briefly summarised below, but they may 
also yield income by helping people get information relevant to their jobs or finding 
jobs. There have been numerous studies of the role ethnic neighbourhoods play in 
mediating access to jobs but a recent example in a European context is provided by 
the work of Coniglio (2004). He has a model in which minority non-local language 
speakers access labour markets via neighbourhood bilinguals who intermediate 
information within the wider labour market. Thus, for those who cannot speak the 
locally dominant language, living in ethnically segregated neighbourhoods does not 
just provide consumption benefits in terms of access to culturally familiar goods and 
services but it generates higher productivity and incomes. He shows that such a model 
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is consistent with the formation and stability of ethnic neighbourhoods in Norwegian 
cities. 
  
Consumption and welfare benefits 
There seems to be quite persuasive evidence that specialised neighbourhoods have 
labour market advantages, even for the poor; indeed particularly for the less skilled 
who rely on personal contacts to a greater extent to find jobs. Even if there are some 
possible negative neighbourhood effects for poorer groups – and the more 
meticulously studies have been able to offset for other factors influencing personal 
outcomes, the less have they found any such effects – still the question also has to be 
asked: are there also consumption benefits from living in specialised, and so 
segregated, neighbourhoods? People systematically tend to choose such 
neighbourhoods. That, itself, suggests there might be benefits which would be lost if 
we adopt policies to compel mixed neighborhoods.  
 
Choice of neighbourhood is constrained by income, as are most economic choices, 
because houses in nicer neighbourhoods cost more (as is discussed in detail below) 
but people choose neighbourhoods on the basis of what a neighbourhood offers them 
which will either yield welfare directly or increase their expected incomes. And 
specialised neighbourhoods are better able to do both.  
 
Specialised neighbourhoods provide direct consumption benefits both because they 
increase the range of choice for people with respect to the types of neighbourhood in 
which to live; and people and families of similar incomes, tastes or points in the life 
cycle tend to consume similar goods and services and require similar amenities. 
Living in a neighbourhood with a local wholefood supermarket, Montessori school, 
gastropub or microbrewery commands a premium: neighbourhoods with 
pawnbrokers, a local Aldi or discount store and a takeaway are cheaper. If you are a 
recent immigrant and want to be able to continue to speak your original language, 
engage in your native culture or religion, and buy food or other items you have 
developed a taste for, then there are great advantages in living in neighbourhoods with 
concentrations of people of similar origin. This is one obvious source of the ethnic 
neighbourhoods of large American and European cities. A recent study of children in 
primary schools found 300 different languages communities in London (Baker and 
Eversley, 2000) living in linguistically and culturally specialised neighbourhoods. 
 
Such agglomeration economies in consumption are not confined to ethnic groups. 
Families with young children will find benefits of networks and facilities, and mutual 
support as well as information, if they live in neighbourhoods with substantial 
numbers of families at the same stage in life. Young singles who eat out and have a 
taste for urban entertainment and culture will similarly find agglomeration economies 
in consumption if they find neighbourhoods in which large numbers of like minded 
people are concentrated. More educated people, and people working in the liberal arts, 
may prefer to live in neighbourhoods with concentrations of similar types, sharing 
leisure and cultural pursuits and seeking similar local shops; business people may 
equally gain consumption benefits from concentrating in neighbourhoods in which 
other business people live. 
 
Ideas and insights about the contribution of specialised neighbourhoods to 
productivity go back a long way – for example to Marshall‘s (Marshall, 1890) famous 
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account of the ways in which Industrial Districts increase productivity and growth, 
because ‗knowledge is in the air‘. Luttmer (2005) explores the central idea that 
people‘s welfare depends not just on their income but decreases as their own income 
falls relative to other people in the community. This idea also has distant roots. He 
quotes John Stuart Mill:  
 
….men do not desire merely to be rich, but richer than other men” 
 
In attempting to test for the significance of this proposition and quantify its effects, 
there are a number of methodological problems - particularly the possibility that 
welfare is itself a relative concept. However, Luttmer (2005) goes to considerable 
lengths to eliminate possible biases from his estimates, including testing against 
absolute measures related to welfare, such as marital conflicts, as well as against 
reported personal welfare itself. He analyses a sample of about 10,000 individuals 
from two phases10 of the National Survey of Families and Households living in a 
sample of 965 neighbourhoods - or 555 neighbourhoods for the sub sample of 
neighbourhoods with respondents living in them at both time periods. His findings are 
striking. Roughly speaking losing $1,000 of own income seems to make people feel 
about as much worse off as their neighbour gaining $1,000!  The estimated impact of 
a positive change of household income on reported welfare is quantitatively almost 
the same as a similar, negative, change in neighbourhood mean incomes.  
 
He subdivides the sample into households of single adults, couples living together at 
both sampling dates (stable couples) and adults living with different partners in the 
second time period. The strong negative impact of neighbours being richer on 
peoples‘ sense of wellbeing estimated for the three groups together turns out to be 
explained mainly by the (large) sub sample of stable couples in the data set. Single 
people do not seem to experience a loss of a sense of wellbeing from neighbours‘ 
extra income. Moreover, the effects are stronger for individuals who socialise with 
neighbours and the effect of neighbours‘ incomes is stronger if the neighbour is more 
similar to you (only tested for those with and without a college education). If 
disaggregated measures of reported welfare are analysed then the main effects were in 
terms of time with family and hours worked. That is, it appears that people living in 
communities where neighbours have higher mean levels of income relative to their 
own, compensate by working longer hours and spending less time with their families 
and in leisure. This causes them to feel themselves to be worse off and have lower 
reported welfare. The evidence points to a real impact of relative, as well as own, 
income on welfare. 
 
Moreover, there is no significant effect of overall neighbourhood inequality. That 
implies it is not living in a less equal neighbourhood that lowers an individual‘s 
welfare but specifically having an income lower than the neighbourhood average. 
Perhaps the main problem with what is a very careful study is the definition of 
‗neighbourhood‘. For reasons of data availability these are the Public Use Microdata 
Areas which, in the 1990 Census, had a mean population of 144,000 people. They are 
certainly considerably larger, therefore, than the usual concept of a neighbourhood. 
On the other hand, given that the findings capture a real effect of relative 
neighbourhood income which, on the basis of the accumulation of evidence Luttmer 
                                                 
10 1987-88 and 1992-94 
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(2005) provides, seems plausible, then having data for smaller areas, corresponding 
more closely to conventional ideas of neighbourhoods, would seem likely to make the 
impact more significant still. The study finds strong evidence that social interaction 
with neighbours is a causal factor and presumably social interactions per neighbour 
are considerably greater with your nearest 500 neighbours than with those living far 
away and not sharing the same schools, shops or parks. In a neighbourhood of 
144,000 there will be few such opportunities to interact with most ‗neighbours‘; in a 
smaller neighbourhood of 500 the chance of such interactions increases greatly. So the 
incomes of nearer neighbours seem more likely to affect one‘s sense of wellbeing than 
those of more distant ones and consequently one might expect Luttmer‘s results to 
have been even more powerful had he had data for smaller neighbourhoods.  
 
The implications of these findings, therefore, would be that welfare in society is 
totally unaffected by whether the rich live mixed with the poor or not. The welfare 
gains of one group would be offset by the losses of the other. It is just that if the poor 
do live close to the rich they will feel worse of than if they do not. The rich, of course, 
would feel even better off so mixing communities effects a net welfare transfer from 
the poor to the rich: plausible but hardly the intended result of a mixed neighbourhood 
policy.  
 
4. The dynamics of neighbourhood segregation 
 
There is little argument about the fact that people and households select themselves 
into neighbourhoods and that neighbourhoods tend to have a degree of homogeneity 
with respect to the characteristics of the people and families who live within them. 
Equally, the fact that cities have neighbourhoods segregated on the basis of income is 
uncontested although the extent of neighbourhood income heterogeneity at any point 
in time is significant. The issue is why rich and poor neighbourhoods emerge and, 
specifically, does living in a poor neighbourhood make poor people or their children 
even worse off than they would otherwise have been? Associated with that question is 
whether, if living in a poor neighbourhood does make people even worse off than they 
would otherwise have been, is the impact sufficient that policy should specifically 
address it?  
 
It is perfectly possible that any neighbourhood effect - if it exists - is comparatively 
small and that the cost of policies to address it effectively is so great compared to the 
costs of other policies to improve the welfare of poor people that attempting to 
achieve ‗mixed neighbourhoods‘ is simply not cost effective. It has already been 
noted that for the MTO project the average cost per head of just providing the expert 
personal advice needed to help poor people successfully find accommodation in an 
affluent neighbourhood was $3,000. Something the studies did not examine at all was 
what happened to the houses vacated by the participants who moved out of the poor 
neighbourhoods. Assuming they were in turn filled by other poor people, then the 
whole MTO effort might not have changed the total number of households still living 
in poor neighbourhoods. That would be conditioned on where the new occupants of 
the vacated houses came from and whether they moved voluntarily. 
 
This brings one to the issue of neighbourhood dynamics. Too frequently, the 
assumption implicit in arguments for neighbourhood-based policies is that the 
inhabitants – the ‗local community‘ – are a stable set of families. But this is not the 
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case. Neighbourhoods are more like buses with a constantly changing set of people in 
them: people/families are always moving in and others moving out. This process is 
not random and may be significantly influenced by neighbourhood-based policies 
themselves. The overall pattern of neighbourhoods is also related to the overall 
distribution of income within the urban housing market concerned: a case can be 
made, indeed, that neighbourhood segregation by income – remembering that many 
personal characteristics such as health, membership of disadvantaged groups, 
education and skills as well as criminality – are strongly correlated with income – is 
effectively just the spatial articulation of the overall income distribution. 
 
If society‘s income becomes more unequally distributed – the rich become richer 
relative to the poor – then residential segregation should be expected to become more 
sharply demarcated; ‗society‘ again being composed of the set of households who 
occupy a given housing market area.11 The mechanism which produces this 
association between inequality and spatial segregation is the interactive sorting role of 
housing and labour markets. Both housing and labour markets are intrinsically 
‘spatial’. Houses and jobs are located precisely in space and the occupation of a 
particular house simultaneously determines a person’s access to their current job and 
other jobs and confers the ability to ‘consume’ a wide range of amenities, 
neighbourhood characteristics and local public goods. 
 
Mobility – getting on means getting out? 
First, let us look at some of the evidence of the determinants of mobility between 
neighbourhoods and why we should not expect policy interventions to be random in their 
impact on the composition of a neighbourhood. An evaluation of a City Challenge 
programme of urban regeneration in Harlesden, in West London, a seriously deprived 
community of about 10,000 people, suggested that training programmes had been well 
designed (after a false start) and well delivered12. There had also been improvements 
in a range of neighbourhood qualities such as fear of crime. The City Challenge 
programme had lasted for 5 years and had injected substantial funds - £37.5 million. 
Despite the apparently successful training provided and the focus of the funding, 
unemployment among people living in the City Challenge neighbourhood at the end 
of the programme was higher relative to both West London as a whole and to 
comparable disadvantaged neighbourhoods than it had been before the programme. 
 
An obvious potential explanation was that people who had improved their labour 
market position as a result of the programme had differentially moved out of the 
neighbourhood. People had moved into the vacant housing to replace those moving 
out but those moving in had even more unfavourable labour market characteristics 
than the average for the community as a whole; and worse than those they replaced. 
To the extent the training programmes succeeded, they induced more churn. 
Paradoxically, therefore, the very success of the programme – if it had induced 
selective mobility – could have led to the deterioration in the unemployment rate of 
current residents noted at the end of the period. 
 
                                                 
11 We can adapt DiPasquale and Wheaton‘s (1996) definition of a geographical real estate market: a 
geographic/spatial housing market is the area which ‗encompasses all housing units that are influenced 
by the same economic conditions…‘ 
12 This section draws on Cheshire et al., 1998. 
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To test this three samples were constructed of people of working age by comparing 
electoral registers for the start and end of the period: one sample was of people 
moving out of the neighbourhood during the period of the programme (the 
‘Outmovers’); one of people resident within the neighbourhood throughout (the 
‘Stayers’); and a third of people moving into the neighbourhood over the five years of 
the programme (the ‘Inmovers’). All Outmovers who could be identified and tracked, 
were surveyed. Samples of the other two groups were drawn randomly from the 
electoral register. Tracking Stayers and Inmovers was not difficult but tracking and 
interviewing Outmovers presented more problems. They were tracked by personally 
calling at their former addresses and asking for their current whereabouts and also by 
using electoral registers for the end period for all London Boroughs and, from those, 
identifying electors who had previously been resident in the Harlesden City Challenge 
area. Very few former residents moving out of London altogether were traced. This 
allowed us to track and interview a sample of 50 Outmovers but there was probably 
some selection bias with respect to those who were located and interviewed since 
successful returns from Outmovers not on the electoral register in their new 
destinations were particularly difficult. Two thirds of the interviewed Outmovers were 
traced by comparing electoral registers.  
 
The usefulness of the training schemes provided by the City Challenge programme 
was rated highly and this rating did not vary between groups. Attendance on the 
training schemes among the currently employed, however, had varied considerably 
across groups. The Stayers and the Inmovers displayed very low levels of 
participation (Stayers 13%; Inmovers 6%) whereas 37% of the Outmovers had 
attended such courses.  Perhaps reflecting this, the Outmovers, as Table 1 shows, had 
substantially improved their position in the labour market compared to five years 
previously on all dimensions and this improvement was statistically significant 
compared to either of the other groups. 
 
Table 1: Mean rating of current job compared to job held 5 years previously * 
 Sample size 
(total number) 
Skill Level of 
Job 
Pay Conditions Satisfaction 
Stayers 270 0.45 0.63 0.53 0.54 
Inmovers 63 0.77 1.23 1.23 0.92 
Outmovers 48 1.4 1.47 1.6 1.2 
Respondents rated the four attributes of their current jobs relative to the job they had held 5 years 
previously on a five point scale ranging from -2 (much worse) to +2 (much better): so the larger the 
number the greater the improvement. 
 
 
Table 2: Labour Market Position at Time of Survey 
 Sample size 
(total number) 
Inactive 
(%) 
Currently Unemployed 
(%) 
Employed 
(%) 
Stayers 270 42 15 41 
Inmovers 63 31 21 48 
Outmovers 48 39 9 51 
 
The Outmovers were less likely to be unemployed than either other group (Table 2) – 
although this was only statistically significant when compared to the Inmovers. Not 
only that but if employed, Outmovers were significantly more likely than either other 
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group to have a full time job. Of the currently employed in the Stayers group, 23% had 
a part-time and 77% a full-time job, whereas amongst the Inmovers only 13% had a 
full time job. Amongst employed Outmovers, in contrast, 97% were working full time. 
Thus, this evidence on the relationship between mobility and labour market position, 
points very strongly to the conclusion that if a person living in a deprived 
neighbourhood improves their employability and gets a job, they have a much 
increased probability of moving out to a better neighbourhood. It also, of course, 
demonstrates the irrelevance of judging the success of programmes designed to 
improve the employability and life chances of the residents of deprived 
neighbourhoods by the unemployment rate of the residents of that neighbourhood at 
the end of the programme. The more successful the programme, the more mobility it is 
likely to induce regardless of where jobs are located since those who upgrade their 
skills and get (better) jobs  – even if they get a job close to where they used to live – 
are more likely to move to a less deprived neighbourhood.  Since Inmovers have much 
higher unemployment rates than other groups, the measured unemployment rate of 
current residents will rise. Compared to the MTO programme, which had no impact on 
the labour market position of adults moving to affluent neighbourhoods, it should, 
however, be noted that providing well designed training for Harlesden City Challenge 
residents did improve their labour market positions: but those who benefited 
disproportionately moved out.  
 
This was a ‘placed-based’ policy intended to help people and it is difficult to think that 
at such a local level and in such a deprived community there was a significant problem 
of market failure associated with a loss of social capital and sense of place as a result 
of induced outward movement (see Bolton, 1992 for a discussion of these issue sin a 
wider context). It was the impact of the programme on the employment prospects of 
people which would seem to be the relevant criterion for judging success: not the 
impact on unemployment of people who happened to live in Harlesden at particular 
date(s). 
 
Nicer neighbourhoods cost more 
As Table 1 shows, improving one’s labour market position usually implies becoming 
richer. The Outmovers not only had relatively more skilled and more interesting jobs 
but their relative pay had increased compared to the other groups. As we learn more 
about how housing markets work, so we can understand better how they may interact 
with labour markets to sort households and individuals into more and less desirable 
neighbourhoods on the basis of their incomes. Cheshire and Sheppard (2004) focus on 
the case of good schools. Better schools (when access to a school is determined by 
geographical catchment areas) are an example of a whole class of ‗goods‘ one might 
call truly ‗positional‘. That is goods which can only be consumed by living in the 
appropriate place where they are available; and for which the ability to buy houses 
giving access to them is chiefly determined not by absolute income but income 
relative to others who are competing for the same ‗goods‘. The most important and 
obvious of these in Britain is access to the best State schools. To the extent that a 
family‘s address controls access to these, educational policy in Britain has created a 
situation in which it is not the most gifted or the most deserving who benefit from the 
best, supposedly free, State schools but those whose parents can afford to buy access 
to them through the housing market. 
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There is now a wealth of evidence showing that housing is a complex good, composed 
of many attributes or characteristics, each of which commands a price. Since Rosen 
(1974) ‗hedonic‘ analysis has become the standard framework within which these 
prices are analysed and estimated. The price of any given house can be thought of as 
the sum of the prices being paid for all its individual and particular attributes given 
their quantities. Although the idea is simple, it has proved fruitful as a way of 
analysing housing markets. Hedonic studies of housing markets have mushroomed 
and it seems to be an area in which genuine progress of a scientific kind has been 
made. Studies have incrementally improved the methodology and refined the 
estimation process.  
 
Evidence that people buy local public goods through their choices in the housing 
market goes back at least to Oates (1968) and estimates of the price paid for school 
quality have improved over time. Recent studies in the US have included Haurin and 
Brasington (1996) and Black (1999). One of the first studies in the UK was Cheshire 
and Sheppard (1995) but more recent estimates by the same authors (Cheshire and 
Sheppard, 2004) reveal much more about the process. Indeed, it has become 
increasingly clear how complicated housing markets are and how sophisticated are the 
ways in which housing attributes – and so ultimately housing itself – are priced.  
 
What people appear to buy as they engage in house hunting is not the current set of 
attributes but something corresponding to the expected long run set of attributes. 
Cheshire and Sheppard (2004) found that it was not just the current quality of primary 
schools (measured by their students‘ performance on standardised tests), which 
determined the price paid for access to ‗primary school quality‘. The price paid also 
incorporated a discount for current school quality dependent on the variance in 
measured quality over the previous five years. There was also a discount if the house 
was located in an area in which new construction was concentrated. Interestingly the 
effect of more new construction in the local area in depressing house prices was 
specifically related to school quality. There was no evidence of just a general negative 
‗area of new construction‘ effect. It was only when local new construction was 
expressed as a discounting factor on local school quality that a statistically significant 
effect on house prices was found. More local construction increased the likelihood 
that an address could be re-assigned to another school as the Local Education 
Authority implemented its explicit policy of filling its available school capacity. It 
may also have increased uncertainty about the composition of the intake to the local 
school in the future as new households moved into the neighbourhood.  So both more 
variation in performance in the past and more local new construction reduced the 
price buyers would pay for the current performance of the school a house gave access 
to. 
 
Moreover, studies are finding increasingly complex interactions with other variables. 
For example, the price paid through the housing market for access to parks or open 
space of a given character appears to vary with the density of the neighbourhood, 
household incomes and local crime levels (Anderson and West, 2006); the price paid 
for proximity to open countryside varies with the likelihood of its remaining 
undeveloped (Irwin, 2002). In the context of school quality, Cheshire and Sheppard 
(2004) found that the price paid for a given quality of local school varied with the 
suitability of the house to accommodate children. These are not surprising findings 
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but data and methods make it increasingly possible to estimate them and make those 
estimates increasingly credible. 
 
What hedonic studies of housing markets show is that access to higher amenity open 
space, natural amenities like views or proximity to water, greater security from crime 
or better quality state provided education, costs a substantial amount. The value of all 
such amenities and local public goods is capitalised into house prices. As an example, 
moving an otherwise average house from the catchment area of the worst to that of the 
best primary school in Reading in 1999/2000 was associated with an increase of one 
third in its price13.  
 
Thus, the ability to benefit from or consume such localised goods is dependent on the 
ability of a household to buy a house in those particular neighbourhoods which give 
access to them. Since the supply of such goods is relatively inelastic and varies 
significantly from neighbourhood to neighbourhood and demand appears to be 
income elastic (Cheshire and Sheppard, 1998), the price rises sharply with increasing 
quality and rising income. But their more or less fixed supply also means that the 
ability to buy such goods is more determined by how rich a household is relative to 
other households competing for the same local amenities than it is by the household‘s 
absolute income: that is, by where a household is in the distribution of incomes in the 
housing market area concerned.  
 
More fundamental aspects of how people live and how real welfare is distributed 
appear to follow from this observation.  As was discussed in Brueckner et al. (1999), 
cities have a natural geographically and topographically determined endowment of 
some amenities – where the best views are to be had, where the natural amenities such 
as river frontage are available or where, as determined by prevailing winds, air quality 
is better. In the context of most Old World cities, of course, there was also a fixed 
neighbourhood within which a particularly valuable local public good – security – 
was available: within the city walls. These locationally fixed amenities or public 
goods generated clustering of those households who had a taste for and could afford 
them. In turn, this generated higher local incomes, supporting better local cultural and 
commercial amenities and classier neighbourhoods with better schools and lower 
crime rates. This further re-enforced the attractions of the more attractive 
neighbourhoods. 
 
While it is common to think of the prices of composite goods, such as housing, as 
being the sum of a set of prices for the individual attributes of which they are made 
up, it is less common to consider a market for each relevant attribute with its own 
demand and supply characteristics. Yet, that is clearly important and the supply 
characteristics of individual housing attributes will vary significantly. Some, such as 
                                                 
13 In the models discussed here all prices are estimated to vary not just as the quantity of the attribute in 
question changes (for example the first bathroom is worth a lot more than the fifth) but as the quantity 
of other attributes varies (for example, the price paid for more space inside a house of given size also 
varies with the size of the garden, or the value paid for primary school quality varies with the suitability 
of the house to accommodate children). As a result, this calculation of the impact on price of moving a 
house from the worst to best primary school catchment area can only be done by assuming some 
particular levels for all other attributes. Here it is assumed that all other attribute levels are equal to the 
sample mean, the sample being a random sample of houses sold in the local housing market in 
1999/2000 used to estimate the model. 
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central heating or the number of rooms in a given space, can easily be reproduced 
industrially and so will be elastic in supply. Others would, in the absence of 
regulation, normally be elastic in supply. More urban space in aggregate (except in 
exceptional places such as Singapore) can always be made available by the 
construction of additional transport infrastructure. In Britain, and increasingly in other 
countries, the supply of urban space is constrained by land use regulations such as 
density controls, urban containment, local zoning or protective designation. Other 
attributes, such as access to particular natural amenities, open spaces or the ‗best‘ 
local, state funded school, may be intrinsically in very inelastic supply. As noted 
above, the demand for most characteristics - including housing space, classier 
neighbourhoods and local amenities appears to be income elastic. Estimates in 
Cheshire and Sheppard (1998) were that for many attributes of this type, evaluated at 
mean household income, income elasticities of demand were in the range 1.5 to 2.  
 
It would appear to follow from this that competition for access to better quality, 
locationally fixed ‗goods‘, will price poorer households out of access to – or at least 
force them to consume lower quality  - local public goods and amenities – and so 
generate systematic patterns of residential segregation between richer and poorer 
neighbourhoods. Given that poverty is correlated with other characteristics such as 
lower educational attainment, poorer health, higher unemployment and membership 
of disadvantaged groups, it would seem plausible that residential segregation is 
largely the spatial articulation of income inequality in society (though of course there 
may be residential segregation between households of similar mean incomes but 
different tastes or characteristics). Residential segregation is associated with lower 
welfare for poorer groups since households derive significant welfare from access to 
the better quality local public goods, including better security, and amenities. This is 
just another manifestation of the price mechanism interacting with the distribution of 
income to allocate goods according to ability to pay and preferences. Indeed, it may 
be an important part of the explanation why access to public services provided out of 
taxation is closely correlated with the distribution of income (Goodin and Le Grand, 
1987). Although they appear to be distributed according to need, in many cases you 
have to ‗buy‘ access to them through the housing market. 
 
A further implication is that if the distribution of household incomes changes, this will 
be reflected in a changing intensity of residential segregation. If, for example, 
incomes become more unequally distributed – as happened in the UK, the US and 
several other OECD countries from the mid 1970s to the mid 1990s – under certain 
circumstances described below, there should, other things being equal, be an 
intensification of residential segregation with the richest and poorest households 
becoming relatively more concentrated in richer and poorer neighbourhoods14. An 
increase in residential segregation has certainly been documented in the US context as 
discussed by Massey and Fischer (2003). They show that inequality across regions has 
decreased while at the same time between neighbourhoods in US urban areas it has 
increased. 
 
This pattern is to be expected if the supply of at least some of these localised goods is 
inelastic (the ‗best‘ local state school or a house overlooking Hampstead Heath or the 
                                                 
14 And, of course, if property owners already living in more/less desirable neighbourhoods, 
experiencing rising/falling relative asset values too – see below. 
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Thames, for example) while the demand is income elastic. If these conditions hold 
then their relative price should be expected to increase if the rich get richer relative to 
the poor. More expensive houses in more expensive neighbourhoods will become 
relatively more expensive still, pricing the poor out to less desirable neighbourhoods 
even more completely.  For example if only 0.05 percent of houses in London can 
overlook a feature as attractive as Hampstead Heath then your the ability to ‗buy‘ that 
feature does not depend so much on your absolute income as on your income relative 
to the incomes of other households who have a taste for overlooking Hampstead 
Heath. 
 
Analysis of the structure of house prices as the quantities of attributes increase 
produces results that are consistent with this perspective. Returning to the findings of 
Cheshire and Sheppard (2004) with respect to the price paid for school quality they 
report a highly non-linear price function with very little change in price if the local 
school goes from being the worst to middling. The price change associated with 
moving from the 75
th
 percentile point in the quality distribution to the best of all – the 
100
th
 percentile point – however, was very large indeed. Their estimates imply 
moving an otherwise average house from the catchment area of the worst primary 
school to that at the 10
th
 percentile in the quality distribution made no discernable 
difference to its price; moving it from that of the 10
th
 to the 90
th
 percentile in the 
quality distribution increased the price by 10.4 percent; but moving it from the 90
th
 to 
the catchment area of the very best primary school would have been associated with 
an additional 16.9 percent increase in its price.  
 
Apart from access to the Thames, where all the price increase was associated with 
having frontage to the river itself, other attributes for which the premium paid for the 
‗best‘ observed was particularly large, were closeness to the town centre, and space – 
both inside houses and for garden space. Equally, there were some attributes for 
which the estimates showed a substantial proportion of the price variation was 
associated with going from having the very ‗worst‘ observed to something just a little 
better: neighbourhood deprivation was such an attribute. For this attribute going from 
the most deprived ward to the 10
th
 percentile place in the distribution of deprivation 
increased the price proportionately more than going from the 90
th
 percentile place to 
the most affluent ward of all. Elaborate precautions were taken in the study to 
standardise for all significant factors affecting local house prices including, of course, 
the social and economic composition of the neighbourhood.  
 
These results are likely to reflect the pattern of preferences but they are also consistent 
with the interpretation offered above. Attributes of houses, or amenities to which 
particular houses give privileged access, which are in fixed or limited supply take on 
the status of truly ―positional goods‖ that are auctioned off via the market for houses 
to the highest bidders. The ability to buy is determined not by absolute income but by 
income relative to other households competing for the same goods. That school 
quality and private land and space consumption should exhibit this behaviour is 
consistent with the argument presented above. Local governments act to constrain the 
supply of land for housing and – no doubt unintentionally - the availability of the 
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highest quality public goods15. An additional source of supply limitation may arise 
from ―peer group effects‖ and the preference of households to live in areas in which 
they find their neighbours desirable or compatible. If richer and better educated 
neighbours, who spend more on their childrens‘ education, are perceived as desirable, 
then the neighbourhoods in which they are concentrated are by definition limited in 
supply and hence local neighbourhood quality becomes a positional good. In this way 
many of the ―non-market‖ interactions that are an essential component of cities (as 
persuasively argued by Glaeser, 2001) are actually brought into a form of market 
allocation via the housing market.  
 
The house and neighbourhood characteristics allocated in the housing market include 
not only the public goods themselves, but also risk and uncertainty concerning their 
levels. As noted above, the measure of the past variation in the quality of a local 
school was also reflected in the price paid for a given current level of measured 
quality.  Gibbons (2004) showed that neighbourhood crime – an indicator of real risk 
– was similarly reflected in house prices in London.  
 
The actual price paid for any attribute will depend on the characteristics of the local 
housing market16 and economy since both these influence the supply and demand 
characteristics of individual attributes. For a given measure of income inequality the 
best local school will cost substantially less in housing markets where average 
incomes are low than they will in high income housing markets because demand is 
income elastic. In the higher income housing market people will be spending a higher 
proportion of their incomes trying to buy educational quality. If incomes become 
more unequal over time (or in housing markets in which incomes are more unequally 
distributed) then the price of attributes in fixed supply will rise and we should expect 
an even stricter sorting of households between nicer and more disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods. The best State schools become even more strictly reserved for the 
richest local households (ignoring private education, access to which is explicitly 
determined by income not place of residence). 
 
Thus, house prices are about much more fundamental economic and social issues than 
dinner party conversations might credit. The way in which the housing market works 
explains an important part of the underlying differences in real welfare in society both 
vertically between households and across space; that is the patterns of spatial 
segregation one observes in all cities. Many local public goods, funded from taxation 
and which we think of as naturally being provided on an equal basis to all households, 
are really much better thought of as being allocated through the housing market. 
                                                 
15 That is not because they usually want there to be worse schools or public parks but because there can 
only be one ‗best‘ school or park. This is not the case with land supply which is intentionally restricted 
in order to implement urban containment policies. 
16 Including, of course, local policy. If access to schools is not determined by place of residence but by 
some other mechanism, for example, by lot, or by selective examination, then there would be no price 
paid via the housing market. Consistent with this and demand for school quality being income elastic is 
the estimated hedonic price of school quality in the Reading compared to the Darlington housing 
markets in 1993 and 1997 respectively. Again looking at the ‗average‘ house, the price per GCSE point 
improvement in Reading, where mean sampled incomes were £28,610 pa, was £243.9 while in 1997, in 
Darlington, where mean incomes were £23,422, it was £30.8. However, since not only were incomes 
lower in Darlington but allocation to schools was less tightly tied to home address, we cannot be sure 
what the contribution of each factor separately was to the difference in the price of ‗school quality‘ for 
the mean home.  
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Consumption of them is thus conditioned on household income in just the same way 
as consumption of foreign holidays, private education or personal security services is 
conditioned on income. But because the supply of many of them is more or less fixed 
within a particular urban area or housing market, income relative to others competing 
for access to the same goods is the real determinant rather than the absolute level of 
income itself. 
 
Pricing the poor out of better neighbourhoods 
If the preceding account is correct and income inequality is an important driver of 
residential segregation, then changes in the distribution of income should lead to 
parallel changes in the distribution of house prices. If the rich become richer relative 
to the poor and so are more effectively able to outbid the poor to gain access to valued 
localised amenities and public goods, the supply of which is inelastic, then expensive 
houses should become relatively more expensive compared to cheap ones.  
 
Data against which to test this are difficult to obtain. It ideally requires a series of 
samples of house prices for a given housing market over time and matching data on 
incomes for households within that same housing market. Such data – at least for UK 
housing markets – are not easily obtained but work done on the Reading housing 
market (reported in Cheshire and Sheppard various and Cheshire et al, 1999) does 
provide such data for two different dates at least – 1984 and 199317. The discussion 
below relates strictly to these two survey-based data sets except where noted. 
 
There was a significant widening of income differentials in England and Wales as a 
whole between 1984 and 1994. For example, the New Earnings Survey (NES) shows 
the ratio of the gross earnings of a person at the 90th percentile point in the 
distribution, relative to the mean as 1.54 in 1984 compared to 1.61 in 1994. The same 
source shows earnings becoming significantly more unequal in Berkshire, with the 
same ratio widening from 1.55 to 1.70. The NES, however, is not really a satisfactory 
source for investigating the overall distribution of household incomes since very high 
earners are excluded from the survey and it relates just to the earnings of individuals. 
The sample data for the Reading area has the great advantage of being precisely 
related to houses and the prices of those houses but it also has some disadvantages. It 
relates to the joint gross incomes of households but only to those owner occupiers in 
the sample from whom a survey was returned. Given that the survey was of occupiers 
of sampled houses for sale or recently sold, a significant proportion of which were 
vacant at the time of survey, the overall response rate of around 47 percent for each 
survey round was respectable. Thus, it differs from the NES in that it excludes 
incomes of renters who have lower incomes on average than owner occupiers but for 
couples both incomes from all sources will be included in the reported household 
gross income, as will the incomes of the highest earners. Thus, we should expect the 
survey distribution to be substantially more unequal, however equality is represented, 
than would be the case of the NES18.  
 
                                                 
17 The data set for 1999/2000 did not contain household income. 
18 The NES excludes all the highest earners but they are included in the survey. Renters have lower 
incomes on average than owner occupiers but the variance of incomes in the lower tail of the overall 
distribution is less than in the upper tail. While the survey undersamples low income households 
because it omits renters, it still includes some low income households, such as owner occupied 
pensioner households. 
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Since incomes were reported by quite large bands (over 20 percent of respondents in 
both surveys were in the highest income band) representing the degree of equality or 
inequality by the ratio of the 90
th
 percentile point to the mean is rather crude but for 
direct comparison with the NES this ratio moved from 1.61 to 1.97 between 1984 and 
1993 – a substantially greater measured increase in income inequality. The Gini 
coefficient may be a more subtle measure of the equality or inequality of a 
distribution. If incomes for each household are interpolated using a standard 
procedure19 then one can estimate a Gini co-efficient for the distribution at each date. 
The value of that was 0.35 in 1984 but 0.53 in 1993: an indication of a very 
substantial increase in income inequality. 
 
Turning to the distribution of house prices, there is a parallel but smaller increase in 
distributional inequality measured by the Gini co-efficient; this moved from 0.22 to 
0.28 between the two survey dates. Examining the (in)equality of the distribution of 
house prices (by comparing the ratio of the 90
th
 percentile point to the mean) also 
shows an increase in house price inequality, with the more expensive houses 
becoming relatively even more expensive between the two periods. The ratio 
increased from 1.46 to 1.66 between 1984 and 1993. 
 
This is far from conclusive evidence in support of the argument above since it is just 
two observations. Nothing of statistical significance can, therefore, be read into it. 
Moreover, conceptually one could argue that changes in the post tax distribution of 
incomes would be more relevant than gross incomes. Arguably, some measure of the 
quality of houses should also be included and this may have changed between 1984 
and 1993. Nevertheless, what evidence is available is consistent with the hypothesis 
that an increase in income inequality leads to a parallel increase in house price 
inequality as the relatively richer compete more successfully for access to the limited 
supply of the ‗best‘ houses in the ‗best‘ neighbourhoods. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper does not argue that ‗neighbourhood effects‘ do not exist. While the 
evidence is overwhelming that poor people are priced into deprived neighbourhoods 
because they are poor, living in the most deprived neighbourhoods is almost by 
definition not a life enhancing experience. Because of peer group and role model 
effects, coupled simply with increased threats to health – even life20 – from accidents 
and crime, the experience may impair the life chances of those who live in them and 
especially those of children raised in them. Before engaging in significant efforts and 
spending substantial resources to use policy to force neighbourhoods to be mixed, 
however, it seems essential to have a clear idea - if such neighbourhood effects exist - 
of how large they are and what benefits specialised, homogeneous neighbourhoods 
may confer on both richer and poorer households.  
 
                                                 
19 Each income band in the survey is represented by a point interpolated applying a Pareto distribution 
to the overall data and each household in each income band is assigned the income at that point. 
20 Studies estimating neighbourhood effects by tracking cohorts of individuals over time, such as 
Oreopoulos (2003) or Bolster et al (2007), since they only track survivors, may underestimate 
neighbourhood effects if being raised in the most deprived neighbourhoods increases death rates for 
young people compared to those the same young people would have experienced if raised in more 
affluent neighbourhoods. 
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The evidence presented and surveyed here suggests that the benefits of specialised 
neighbourhoods are significant both in terms of finding suitable jobs and increasing 
the range of choices available to people and the welfare they derive from living in 
cities. Despite major research efforts and expenditure – for example the US 
experiment of the Moving to Opportunity programme – evidence of any significant 
additional negative effects of living in deprived neighbourhoods (compared to the fact 
of poverty and the factors which tend to make someone poor in the first place) is very 
elusive. Evidence of positive externalities improving the welfare and lives of the poor 
as a result of having affluent neighbours is difficult to find. So long as – but always 
subject to their income constraint - people choose the neighbourhoods in which they 
live, unless there are such externalities, how can we justify policy interventions to 
force people to move from where they have chosen to live? 
 
Moreover even if the existence of hard to find neighbourhood effects meant there 
were some benefits from mixing communities, there are almost certainly costs too, 
and to judge the policy, it is the net gains, including the costs, that should be decisive. 
The costs are likely to reflect the processes which underlie the persistence of 
neighbourhoods segregated along income lines because these would have to be 
reflected in the scale of resources needed to achieve neighbourhoods that are more 
mixed as a lasting element in our cities. The evidence suggests it is not just a one off 
cost that would need to be met but a continuing cost to prevent neighbourhoods 
unmixing again. 
 
 The evidence reviewed here, particularly the most recent findings from cohort studies 
and the MTO project, does not support the conclusion that neighbourhood effects are 
quantitatively all that important nor that moving the poor to affluent neighbourhoods 
on balance improves their welfare. However, we do know that the rich can always 
outbid the poor for nicer neighbourhoods because the desirable attributes of these 
neighbourhoods are fully reflected in the prices of houses within them. To the extent 
that this is true, social segregation in cities must largely reflect economic inequality 
rather than causing it. Forcing neighbourhoods to be mixed in social and economic 
terms is, therefore, mainly treating the symptoms of inequality not the causes. It may 
make decent people feel better but it does not address the problem. 
 
At the same time there seem to be direct welfare benefits from living in specialised 
neighbourhoods with other complementary and similar households and probably 
productivity benefits, too, because of better labour market networking and matching. 
These seem to apply to poorer less skilled people as much as – even more than – the 
rich and educated. To the extent that these are significant, mixed neighbourhood 
policies directly destroy a potential source of welfare and a portion of the 
consumption and productivity benefits cities are capable of delivering. In addition, if 
Luttmer‘s (2005) findings generally apply and welfare falls as a person‘s income falls 
relative to their neighbours‘, then that is an additional and persuasive reason why 
mixed neighbourhoods may reduce the welfare of poorer people. All these possible 
losses need to be balanced against any benefits of reduced negative ‗neighbourhood 
effects‘. 
 
Amongst the many things poor people buy less of is the amenities available from 
living in affluent neighbourhoods.  Their poverty constrains them to consume less of 
everything. Food stamps may be paternalistic but at least we know that poor people 
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benefit from eating better (and having some extra income left over to spend on other 
things). The problem is that there is scant evidence that the poor get any net benefits 
from being forced to live in more affluent neighbourhoods. They will have better local 
amenities than they could otherwise afford but if they have any choice in where they 
currently live, the evidence of their location shows they valued other things more. 
They lose the support of other families like themselves and local services tailored to 
the needs of poorer people rather than the rich. Having a sympathetic small shop 
within walking distance which, though it may have high prices, stocks what you want 
and may give a bit of credit when you are most hard pressed, is a lot more useful to a 
struggling single parent than being a short drive from a wholefood supermarket 
catering for affluent professionals. 
 
That the disadvantaged are concentrated in poor neighbourhoods does not 
demonstrate that poor neighbourhoods are a cause of disadvantage. If that is the case, 
the conclusion for policy is to reduce income inequality in society not build ‗mixed 
neighbourhoods‘ or improve the built environment in such neighbourhoods. Mixed 
neighbourhood policies may divert attention from the need for effective income 
redistribution. Policies should help people and people who are effectively helped have 
an increased probability of moving away from the poor neighbourhoods in which they 
currently live. This, in turn, is likely to make the indicators for those poor 
neighbourhoods worse rather than better: but that does not mean that the policy was 
not a success.  
 
The obverse of this is that if policies do not effectively address the underlying causes 
of poverty, improving the physical environment and amenities of deprived 
neighbourhoods may simply displace poorer people to even less attractive 
neighbourhoods, so the poorest have to bear disruption costs as well as poverty while 
continuing to live in a low quality built environment. These arguments do not, of 
course, imply that it is never useful to deliver policies aimed at reducing societal 
inequality in poor neighbourhoods (e.g. programmes to improve labour force skills or 
reduce crime).  It is in the poorest neighbourhoods that those who most need the help 
of people-targeted policies tend to be concentrated. 
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